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Raiffeisenism abroad: why did German cooperative banking fail in Ireland but prosper in the Netherlands?
Why did imitations of Raiffeisen's rural cooperative savings and loans associations work well in some European countries, but fail in others? This article considers the example of Raiffeisenism in Ireland and in the Netherlands. Raiffeisen banks arrived in both places at the same time, but had drastically different fates. In Ireland they were almost wiped out by the early 1920s, while in the Netherlands they proved to be a long-lasting institutional transplant. Raiffeisen banks were successful in the Netherlands because they operated in a niche market with few competitors, while rural financial markets in Ireland were unsegmented and populated by long-established incumbents, leaving little room for new players, whatever their institutional advantages. Dutch Raiffeisen banks were largely selffinancing, closely integrated into the wider rural economy and able to take advantage of economic and religious divisions in rural society. Their Irish counterparts were not. aiffeisen banks were a type of financial intermediary designed in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century to provide small-scale financial services to customers in rural areas. Their organizational form was then novel; they were owned and operated cooperatively by the people who borrowed from them. European rural reformers of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries adopted the Raiffeisen cooperative banking model as a means of empowering and improving the lives of farmers.
1 However, outside Germany their success was variable, despite the efforts of their idealistic early propagators; Raiffeisenism prospered in Italy and the Netherlands, failed in Belgium,
Ireland and Spain, and never even got off the ground in Denmark. This article explores the reasons for this variation in performance by comparing their fate in Ireland and the Netherlands. The striking features of Raiffeisenism in these countries, on which the comparison focuses, are in: (1) their reliance on savings as a source of funding; (2) the levels of integration within and between cooperative enterprises; and (3) their treatment of socioreligious and socioeconomic divisions.
The literature on early cooperative banking in Europe includes the ground-breaking work of Guinnane and his co-authors, 2 who seek to explain the performance of Raiffeisen cooperatives, principally in Germany, at the turn of the century. Guinnane's major contribution has been to argue that they were successful because they could overcome by mutuality the information asymmetries and enforcement problems that prevented conventional banks from lending to the rural unbanked and 1 Parallels between cooperative banks in the past and microfinance institutions today have been drawn by various scholars (see Bátiz-Lazo and Billings, 'New perspectives', for a review of the recent literature).
Raiffeisenism suggests that the polities form a matched pair, in their broadly similar agricultural sectors and religious heterogeneity. These commonalities enable the present study to better identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the long-run success of Europe's early cooperative banks.
Three findings emerge from section II, which compares the function and design of Raiffeisenism in Ireland and the Netherlands. The first, discussed in section III, is that savings rates were a key success factor of the Raiffeisen model. Unlike their German progenitors, both Dutch and
Irish cooperators chose to adopt institutional names with no reference to saving. In practice, however, Dutch cooperatives retained an emphasis on savings; to finance their loan books boerenleenbanken (farmers' lending banks) relied on members' deposits rather than external borrowing. By contrast, concessional state loans were the main source of finance for Ireland's Raiffeisen banks, known locally as agricultural banks or agricultural credit societies.
The second, discussed in section IV, is that the close integration, both horizontal and vertical, of different cooperative enterprises was an important determinant of success. In the Netherlands, Raiffeisen banks enjoyed strong federated apex institutions and overlapped in membership and management with other local cooperative enterprises which they financed. By contrast, cooperatives in
Ireland showed few signs of integration.
The third finding, discussed in sections V and VI, is that socioreligious and socioeconomic division led in the Netherlands to a dichotomous cooperative banking structure for Catholics and Protestants, with strong independent cooperative networks, attracting all strata of society. However, though cooperatives were promoted as compatible with Roman Catholicism, the majority religion in Ireland, the political economy of Irish rural society seems to have discouraged them from taking root.
Together, these three findings suggest not only that Dutch and Irish forms of cooperative banking had important institutional differences, but also that they differed crucially in the functions they performed (section VII Everyone who knows anything at all of agricultural co-operation is familiar with the main features of the system, namely, unlimited liability, an area restricted to a village or two, small shares, limited dividends or no dividends at all, indivisible reserve, loans to members only, low rates of interest and honorary management controlled by the general assembly of members, each of whom has one vote and no more. In detail one country or province may vary from another, but the ground principles are everywhere the same, and wherever they are found and however they appear to be derived, their ultimate origin is Germany and their sponsor Raiffeisen.
The institutional attributes of Raiffeisen cooperatives in Ireland and the Netherlands compared with Germany's ( In all three polities, cooperative banks were unit independent and affiliated to various apex institutions. In Germany these institutions were regional, while in the Netherlands they were theoretically national and apolitical, but in practice divided to reflect the strong socioreligious division of Dutch society -a phenomenon known as verzuiling (pillarization). 27 In both Germany and the Netherlands, apex institutions, acting as clearinghouses and auditors, were cooperatively owned by member cooperatives (federated "cooperatives' cooperatives"): distinct institutions in Germany, but united in the Netherlands in organizations called centrale banken (central banks). Ireland, by contrast, did not develop such institutions. Its apex, the IAOS, helped establish individual cooperatives (banks, creameries and stores) and provided auditing services, but was unfederated and not a clearinghouse.
Cooperative integration, between cooperative banks and also among other cooperative enterprises, 24 Sowers, 'The role of social networks', finds that loan cosignatories were often borrowers too, causing dense interconnected networks of financial ties between Raiffeisen cooperators.
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distinguished Raiffeisenism in Germany and the Netherlands from Ireland, where little integration appeared.
Comparing the agricultural sectors of these polities reveals some similarities but noticeable differences (tables 2 and 3). Regarding the output per hectare of arable land, Ireland resembled the Netherlands in wheat, barley, oats and potatoes and both showed higher output than Germany. Ireland had a higher ratio of cattle and sheep per 1,000 population than the other two. 28 Over time, a noticeable difference was the Dutch focus on dairy versus livestock production and the rapid expansion of horticulture. 29 The data suggest that all three had similar farm sizes -mainly small-scale -but that farm ownership differed. 30 While these data take little account of Irish and Dutch regional specialisation, they suggest overall that Raiffeisenism was introduced to largely comparable agricultural structures and hence that the success or failure of the movement depended more on other factors.
[Insert tables 2 and 3]
What factors might these be? Possible answers in the Irish case are found in the work of Guinnane: (1) competition in savings markets from the POSB; (2) lack of strong union federations;
and (3) Using insights from the above comparisons as points of departure, this article advances three interrelated explanations for the varying success of Raiffeisenism abroad: (1) how cooperatives were funded; (2) how far they became integrated into the rural economy; and (3) how far they could exploit the religious and economic divisions in rural society.
III
Rural activists in both Ireland and the Netherlands perceived a need for Raiffeisen banks; but their subsequent economic function in these polities diverged. How does this help explain Dutch success and Irish failure? Contemporaries at the IAOS and in Dutch farmers' unions had the same argument:
any problems faced by farmers wanting financial services would be solved by cooperative banks.
Their descriptions of market conditions suggest that the financial intermediaries at the time practised either "credit rationing" or "red-lining". 37 Credit rationing implies that banks might increase their market share and attract more borrowers even by increasing interest rates or collateral requirements, but hesitate to do so due to the high risk of the proposed projects or to some information asymmetry 34 See, e.g., Mooij, De Rabobank. 35 
Rommes, Voor en door boeren?
36 A succinct history of boerenleenbanken in the interwar period is found in Mooij, 'De brandkast'. 37 Credit rationing, an equilibrium concept, occurs when borrowers' demand for credit is turned down, even if these borrowers are willing and able to pay both the interest rate and meet the collateral requirements of prevailing loan contracts. Red-lining -a term originally coined to describe the practice of marking a red line on a map to delineate areas where banks would not invest, and later linked to discrimination -occurs when complete categories of borrowers are totally excluded from the credit market because they do not have the necessary future cash flows or collateral to service loans at prevailing prices (Freixas and Rochet, Microeconomics of banking, p. 172).
which makes business performance unverifiable. 38 Red-lining, conversely, implies that banks could increase their market share only by reducing interest rates and collateral requirements, but demur because they judge the probable returns insufficient.
While both credit rationing and red-lining force farmers to self-finance their projects, or shelve them entirely, they imply very different functions for both present and intending suppliers of rural financial services. Red-lining implies that, thanks to lower overheads, Raiffeisen banks were uniquely placed to offer financial services to first-time users by lowering prevailing prices. Credit rationing, by contrast, implies that cooperatives acted as niche players, serving borrowers excluded from credit markets because of the (perceived) places not served by JSBs, because these were already adequate for the areas in which they operated, it responded that cooperatives had advantages over JSBs and would benefit farmers wherever they were set up. At this stage, the IAOS felt that incumbents were credit rationing, and that their new cooperatives would be able to displace their competitors.
The later actions of the IAOS suggest that they gradually realised their own limitations, that they would struggle to outdo JSBs on their home turf. In 1902 the IAOS signed an agreement giving all cooperative enterprises concessional rates from the JSBs in return for promising not to let cooperative banks mobilize deposits. 41 The IAOS then took trouble to declare that its Raiffeisen societies were not the JSBs' rivals. Indeed, in a government inquiry into agricultural credit in Ireland, George Russell, a charismatic IAOS official, described Raiffeisen societies as auxiliary JSBs, de facto 38 Stiglitz and Weiss, 'Credit rationing'. 39 Bester, 'Screening vs rationing'.
branches in isolated areas. 42 The IAOS appears to have turned around, deciding that Ireland's major financial services providers were not credit rationing, but rather red-lining, in refusing to serve the areas where they judged the returns were too low. In their view, it was up to Raiffeisen banks to serve there since they could reduce prevailing prices thanks to their unique ownership structure and business model. Their subsequent performance implies that these were insufficient. services, only unwanted extra competition. These studies suggest that the incumbents were credit rationing: credit was available, but the only way to attract more custom was to offer services to riskloving individuals willing to pay higher interest rates with low collateral requirements.
It is the contention here that boerenleenbanken succeeded because they changed the rules of the game: offering cheap integrated savings and loans services meant they could both displace competitors in, and further expand, the markets for savings and loans. Lower fixed costs came from not paying management, operating from cashiers' personal premises and opening only for short periods. 45 Combined with a system of cosignatories and unlimited liability, these low costs meant low interest rates in return for higher, if non-traditional, collateral; Raiffeisen societies could poach lowrisk borrowers from incumbents, leaving only high-risk borrowers behind. The absence of bank failures among boerenleenbanken in the 1920s financial crisis is testament to this; cooperatives were cherry-picking the safe customers, ignoring the riskier ones implied in the arguments of Jonker, Brusse and Rommes.
What was the attitude of the cooperative movement's leaders towards incumbent credit suppliers? Irish cooperative propagandists reserved a special hatred for gombeenism, a term that had come to include all non-bank incumbents: moneylenders, loan sharks, and consumer credit. In many respects the Raiffeisen Organisation offers, probably, the best model for the organisation of agricultural co-operative societies; but the difficulty of adopting it as a pattern for Irish agricultural co-operative organisation arises from the circumstance that it is specially framed for the benefit of savings and loan societies doing supply business and that productive societies (dairy societies &c.) were an afterthought in this organisation. 83 Lack of vertical integration did not hamper the development of Irish dairies. In this respect these enterprises mirror the Danish ones on which they were modelled (O'Rourke, 'Culture, conflict and cooperation'), where the economic function of JSBs was fulfilled by songesparekasser. 84 Birchall, The international co-operative movement.
IAOS was to 'persuade' people to adopt cooperation, which it did by hiring travelling organizers to talk to rural groups and explain the benefits of cooperative methods. George Russell, one such organizer, enticed the crowds with promises of concessional state loans. 87 Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, propagandists were significantly more active in Catholic networks; priests were invited to lecture at special meetings of the Catholic farmers' unions on the benefits of cooperative banking.
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The central bank would then provide farmers with the necessary literature and legal advice to set up a local bank. 89 Unlike the Irish case, however, the propaganda often continued long after a cooperative's original foundation; the Catholic Church maintained informal links with "their" cooperatives by installing parish priests or other church officials as spiritual advisers to their board of directors. 90 It is this link between banking and religion, the subject of the following section, which appears to have been key to the Dutch success. were crucial in creating the first cooperative banks; these groups viewed cooperatives as a way of consolidating or extending their political influence. Plunkett's successor at DATI was T. W. Russell, who, it is claimed, was openly hostile towards all forms of cooperation. 101 Anderson highlights his antipathy to credit cooperatives: 'He [Russell] declared publicly that the system under which the credit societies were formed was "rotten and indefensible" and gave it as his opinion that the £24,000 lent by the Board was "not worth more than While reason (1) was probably the most important, it was insufficient alone to ensure their success.
Conversely, it is doubtful whether Irish cooperatives would have succeeded if they had been more integrated, horizontally or vertically, or able to take advantage of Irish social divisions, without also being able to mobilize rural savings on a large scale.
Together, this paper's three categories of reasons for the divergent performance of Raiffeisenism abroad inform a new comparison of the financial functions performed by cooperative banks for rural customers. Of five functions that Merton argues to be key to any financial service sector, the Dutch boerenleenbanken performed four and Irish agricultural banks two only (see table 4 ).
In particular, Ireland's Raiffeisen societies failed to provide ways of managing uncertainty and risk and to minimize information asymmetries and incentive problems. Incumbent institutions already performed these functions and probably benefited from being first-movers; no institutional advantages were gained from the peculiar design of Raiffeisen's banks in the Irish context.
[Insert table 4]
As discussed in the introduction, this article is motivated by the pioneering work of Guinnane, who argues that Irish cooperatives were a failure for three reasons: (1) competition in savings markets from the POSB; (2) the weakness of the IAOS as an apex institution; and (3) detrimental norms peculiar to Irish society. 116 This article strengthens and revises Guinnane's conclusions as follows: (1) it was competition from JSBs rather than the POSB that hampered Raiffeisenism in Ireland, competitors largely absent from Dutch markets, where a post office bank also operated; (2) the IAOS chose not to establish a federated clearinghouse to survive this competition, while Dutch apex institutions were free to fully integrate into the rural economy; and (3) the poor trust Guinnane observes in Irish society can be explained by socioreligious and socioeconomic division.
In conclusion, in light of the discussion in this article, Guinnane may be said to have asked the wrong question; the issue is not why Raiffeisen banks failed in Ireland, but rather why they succeeded in the Netherlands. The Netherlands had a highly segmented market, with different specialist financial institutions serving different groups. Raiffeisen banks could take advantage of a large, still mostly unpopulated niche within this market, unpopulated, at least, by banks that could reap full benefit from embedding themselves in their society. In contrast, Ireland enjoyed competitive, unsegmented markets in which incumbents, such as JSBs and savings banks, already offered rural societies a full complement of financial services; new entrants had little room and little advantage was to be gained from cooperative ownership. 116 Guinnane, 'A failed institutional transplant'. 
